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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper explores a style-phase model of staged organizational responses to external pressure for 
change against two competing hypotheses, focusing on demands for greater openness and 
transparency. A study of six risk regulation regimes in the UK revealed that only half were exposed 
to substantial pressures of this type. Responses of organizations in the ‘high-pressure’ regimes were 
varied, but the overall pattern was consistent with a mixture of an autopoietic and staged-response 
hypothesis stressing blame-prevention, and the paper accordingly presents a hybrid ‘Catherine-
wheel’ model of the observed pattern. The paper concludes by discussing the implications for policy 
outcomes. 
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RISK REGULATION UNDER PRESSURE: PROBLEM-SOLVING OR BLAME-SHIFTING?1
 
1. BACKGROUND: OPENNESS IN RISK REGULATION REGIMES 
 
Openness and transparency in regulation is conventionally regarded as a formula for ‘good 
governance’, because of its expected effects in reducing corruption and transaction costs, increasing 
legitimacy and legality of regulation, and improving policy quality through enhanced intelligence 
and learning (see for instance Bentham, 1931, p. 410 and 1983, p. 410; New Zealand Treasury 1987, 
p. 48; Brin, 1998). The aim of this paper is to assess how widespread demands for increased 
openness are in risk regulation and how organizations engaged in risk regulation and management 
respond to such pressures. To what extent or in what conditions do they seek to contain the pressure, 
alter what they do or simply roll with the punch? 
 
There are plenty of bar-room anecdotes about the organizational politics of such responses. 
But research of a more systematic kind is still in its infancy. In a partial attempt to fill the gap, this 
paper draws on a detailed study of risk regulation regimes (RRRs) in six different policy domains 
(see Hood et al, 1999). The aim is to explore how far conventional accounts of organizational 
responses to environmental disturbance describe institutional behaviour in the face of pressures for 
increased openness and transparency. The next (second) section defines openness and identifies 
pressures for openness in the RRR six-pack referred to above. The third section lays out some 
hypotheses about expected institutional responses and outlines a standard disturbance-response 
model of institutional behaviour in the face of pressures for increased openness. The fourth section 
describes observed institutional behaviour in three regimes subject to strong pressures for increasing 
openness, and the fifth section assesses the fit between observed behaviour and the hypotheses 
described earlier. The sixth section develops a hybrid form of two of the hypotheses, and the final 
section discusses what has been learned and its implications for policy. 
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2. DEFINING AND TRACKING RRR OPENNESS 
 
 ‘Increasing openness’ is defined for this purpose as involving some or all of the following 
three elements: 
(i) greater transparency in organizational procedure; 
(ii) wider participation in some or all elements of an RRR; 
(iii) heightened accountability in the sense of increased obligations on the part of those responsible 
for regulating and managing risks to explain and justify their behaviour to others. 
Indicators of a change in openness as defined above accordingly include changes in information rules 
(extending access to information) and participation rules (extending the range of players in the 
decision process) and de facto accountability by decision-makers to public scrutiny. Openness in the 
sense defined above can be analytically distinguished from social pressures for increased openness, 
in the form of campaigns by media, law courts, business lobbies, politicians or other pressure groups. 
The extent of media scrutiny overlaps the condition of openness and pressures for greater openness, 
but pressures for greater openness are here taken to mean specific demands for change in that 
direction coming from business interests, the media and other lobby groups. 
 
Some changes in openness in risk regulation and management may go across a whole society 
or legal jurisdiction (for instance, with freedom of information measures, human rights conventions 
or larger cultural shifts). And there is no doubt that some domains of risk regulation, like food safety, 
health care and nuclear power, have experienced considerable pressures for increased openness over 
the last decade or two. Nevertheless, social and political pressures to increase openness in RRRs do 
not seem to be of equal intensity for all types of risk, despite generalizations sometimes offered about 
risk regulation as a whole being exposed to such pressures (Health and Safety Executive, 1998, p. 6; 
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 1998). Appendix 1 describes changes in the three 
elements of openness noted above for six selected domains of risk regulation in the UK. Those 
domains are: (i) domestic radon- a natural radioactive gas radon that seeps into homes in some parts 
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of the country; (ii) benzene - the car exhaust air pollutant and genotoxic carcinogen; (iii) the release 
of paedophile ex-offenders into the community; (iii) dangerous dogs; (iv) road risk regulation, 
particularly concerning the changing balance of road risks between those in motor vehicles and other 
road users; and (vi) pesticide residues in food and drinking water. 
 
Appendix 1 (a) summarizes the continuing ‘openness’ characteristics of three RRRs (radon, 
dangerous dogs and road risks) that do not seem to have been subjected to substantially increasing 
pressures for openness over the past two decades. Appendix 1 (b) gives the same information for 
three other RRRs (benzene, paedophile release and pesticide residues in food and drinking water) 
where pressures for openness appear to have grown. In each case, we present the salient features of 
the information rules and conventions operating within the RRR (legal obligations or conventions on 
reporting, collecting and disclosing information); the participation and scrutiny rules, and the amount 
of de facto accountability to public or media scrutiny by those regulating or managing the risk. 
Putting those three elements together enables us to assess the overall level of openness of the RRR, 
though that assessment is necessarily qualitative. Scoring overall regime openness is certainly not an 
exact science. 
 
Nevertheless, even from a broad-brush qualitative analysis of a limited set of cases, we can 
draw at least three general conclusions. First, as noted earlier, RRRs vary considerably both in their 
point of departure - the status quo level of openness - and also in the degree of change in openness 
over recent decades. Second, regimes starting from a low base in ‘openness’ are not necessarily 
exposed to strong ‘catching up’ pressures to converge with those starting from a high base. While 
Appendix 1 includes at least one case of an RRR (road risks) starting from a relatively high status 
quo level of openness that shows little change from the status quo level, the reverse does not always 
apply. The domestic radon case in the UK shows that in the absence of outside pressure there can be 
a low degree of movement from a low status quo level (Leiss et al, 1998).  
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Third, while all the three ‘change cases’ described in Appendix 1 (a) are regimes previously 
dominated by cohesive professional policy communities, Appendix 1 (b) shows RRRs can move to 
greater openness in different ways and in response to different pressures. This finding shows the 
value of a comparative-regime approach for the analysis of regulatory dynamics and also suggests 
that a plurality of styles and routes to openness may lead to different policy or institutional 
consequences, given the conventional expectations about the effects of policy openness as 
summarized at the outset.  
 
To better understand the consequences of openness pressures, the institutional responses in 
those regimes experiencing high pressures for change from the status quo need to be examined (given 
that neither the condition of openness nor pressures for greater openness appear universal or uniform 
in RRRs). Accordingly we give a detailed account of institutional changes in the three cases in 
Appendix 1 (b) after considering hypotheses about institutional responses in the next section. 
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3. HYPOTHESES ABOUT RESPONSES TO PRESSURES FOR OPENNESS IN RRRS 
 
What institutional responses to pressures for openness might be expected within RRRs? 
Many scholars have commented on the diversity of institutional theory (e.g. Hall and Taylor, 1997) 
and some have even questioned whether there is any distinctive institutional approach at all (e.g. 
John 1998, p. 65). But a theme which runs through much institutional analysis is a vision of human 
organizations and conventions as relatively closed systems which adapt selectively to environmental 
disturbance (the ‘disturbance’ in this case being pressures for increased openness). Selective 
adaptation means that institutions adopt strategies for survival that seek to reconcile their own 
purposes and imperatives with environmental conditions or external demands. Institutions are thus 
seen as filters or distorting lenses in their dealings with the outside world (for example in Clay and 
Schaffer’s (1984, p. 10) ‘bureaucratic paradox’, in which organizations focus on what is readily 
doable whether or not it contributes to some larger purpose). Although such ideas are often linked 
with biological evolutionary-strategy metaphors, they can be derived from independent propositions 
about individual and social behaviour. 
 
Responses to demands for increased openness in risk regulation offer a particularly good test 
site for this institutionalist perspective. There are good reasons to expect the filtering or distorting 
processes that institutionalists emphasize, because more transparency, participation and 
accountability can increase the threat of blame and liability for failures or make regulators’ work 
more stressful and conflict-laden. Indeed, one of the reasons why institutions limit openness in risk 
regulation in the first place is to limit or deflect blame and liability (in line with standard advice from 
lawyers and insurers to ‘never admit fault’). So in spite of the policy consequences conventionally 
expected to flow from increased openness, as discussed at the outset, there are especially strong 
reasons to expect a filtering response to demands for increased openness in risk regulation, whether 
in the form of privacy protection (Brin, 1998), official secrecy or commercial confidentiality. 
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Three hypotheses about institutional responses to demands for more RRR openness were 
initially examined. None of them imply anything about the desirability or otherwise of organizational 
adaptation to pressures for change, and all of them were initially examined at the level of individual 
organizations rather than regimes (we shall return to the regime perspective later). The three 
hypotheses are as follows: 
 
(a) a null hypothesis of neutral compliance by organizations to external demands without perceptible 
filtering or distortion. Full compliance behaviour can be considered a ‘null hypothesis’ because, 
by positing that organizational responses to demands for increased openness will be 
straightforward and unproblematic, it runs against the central tenet of institutionalist analysis. 
 
(b) at the opposite extreme, a hypothesis drawn from the idea of autopoiesis (the tendency towards 
self-closure in the conceptual programmes of bounded systems with rich patterns of ‘discourse’ 
that makes it impossible to exert direct control over those systems from outside (Brans and 
Rossbach, 1997, p. 432ff)). From an autopoietic perspective, institutions would tend to respond to 
pressures for greater openness in ways that reproduced their own purposes (particularly over 
issues of blame shifting and blame avoidance) or modi operandi with minimal disturbance.  
 
(c) A hypothesis somewhere between the first and the second that posits a staged-response pattern. 
The idea is that institutions respond to pressures for increased openness in a series of phases or 
steps that amount to a staged retreat or rearguard action away from some initially-preferred 
position in the face of pressure for abandonment of that position. Style-phase models of such 
‘staged-retreat’ responses are common in institutional theory (see for example Beck Jørgensen, 
1985 and 1987; Joo, 1999). And it is common to distinguish, following Levy (1986), between 
‘first-order’ and ‘second-order’ responses by organizations to environmental disturbance. First-
order responses involve shifts in managerial arrangements and other organizational systems that 
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leave core value systems or deeper structures unchanged. ‘Second-order’ responses involve 
changes in those value systems. 
 
In a well-known development of this general approach, Laughlin (1991) (see also Laughlin 
and Broadbent, 1995) and his colleagues have further differentiated first-order and second-order 
institutional responses to environmental disturbance. Laughlin divides first-order responses into 
‘rebuttal’ (responses designed to resist the disturbance) and ‘reorientation’ (responses designed to 
change an organization without affecting its core values). Similarly, second-order responses, 
involving changes in core values, are divided into 'colonization' (where new core values have 
colonized part of the organization) and 'evolution' (where all stakeholders have absorbed the new 
core values). ‘Evolution’ would have a different meaning at the level of regimes rather than single 
organizations, as we discuss later, but for the moment the focus is mainly on adaptation at the level 
of individual organizations.  
 
Laughlin does not present the four responses in style-phase terms, though he argues that the 
first three are ‘progressive’ in some sense (Laughlin 1991: 200). He suggests that ‘evolution’ will 
normally be produced by forces different from the other three responses and argues that attempts to 
produce ‘colonization’ change in organizations by increasing financial pressure will not always 
succeed. Nevertheless, for our third hypothesis we modify Laughlin’s approach by representing the 
four responses as progressive forms of ‘staged retreat’, going from the least to the most radical kind 
of adaptation as outside pressure for change continues. The hypothesis is that in such circumstances 
organizations move from first-order to second-order responses following the pathway depicted in 
Figure 1. This hypothesis is a mixture of the null hypothesis and the autopoetic hypothesis in that it 
leads us to expect first-order responses to new environmental demands that involve some element of 
autopoiesis, to be followed later by responses that are closer to the null hypothesis. 
 FIGURE 1: Institutional Responses to Environmental Disturbance: Laughlin’s Four Types of Change 
Conceived as a Progressive Set of Responses 
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4. A TALE OF THREE RRRs FACING PRESSURES FOR INCREASED OPENNESS 
 
We now examine the relative plausibility of the three hypotheses set out above by analyzing the 
institutional dynamics of the three RRRs that were exposed to continuing pressure for increased 
openness as outlined in Appendix 1. This section gives a brief narrative account of developments in 
each of those three RRRs, and we assess the hypotheses in the light of these cases in the following 
section. The focus is on the collection of organizations involved in risk regulation in each regime, 
comprising both public-sector organizations and third-sector or corporate organizations with a role as 
intermediaries in regulation (notably in the form of obligations on corporations to operate first-line 
controls subject to general oversight from regulators). 
 
(a) Regulating the Risk of Paedophiles Released from Custody 
 
Increased awareness and public discussion of the sexual abuse of children by adults has been 
observable in the UK and many other developed countries over the last decade. While statistically the 
greatest risk to children of murder or sexual abuse comes overwhelmingly from family members, 
public debate focuses largely on risks from strangers, particularly those with a criminal record for 
such offences. Several interviewees from the police, probation and social services told us that as 
recently as fifteen years ago, neither these services nor the public saw the risk of child sexual abuse 
as widespread. The state was not obliged to collect systematic information on the whereabouts and 
risks of ex-offenders in the community. Such information as existed was limited and ad hoc, rarely 
shared amongst the relevant state organizations (police, probation officers, housing and social-
services professionals) and never relayed to the general public. 
 
Professional and public concern about the risks from paedophiles in the community grew in 
the 1990s, in the context of controversial child sexual abuse investigations, releases from prison of 
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high-profile ex-offenders, and cases of infiltration of state education and social welfare organizations 
by paedophiles. What-to-do debates focused on the information held by the state on offenders, the 
sharing of that information among police and other public agencies, and its public disclosure. Central 
to the debate was a risk/risk tradeoff issue. Reducing the risk of child sexual abuse by publicly 
identifying released paedophiles may increase the risk of vigilante activity. The prospect of increased 
vigilante activity in turn increases incentives for ex-offenders to go underground, out of the reach of 
support and surveillance services, thus potentially mitigating or confounding the intended goal of risk 
reduction. Such downside risks of transparency have been much stressed by civil libertarians both in 
the USA and UK. 
 
The UK government response to increased public concern was the 1997 Sex Offenders Act. 
Paralleling similar developments in the USA, the Act required the police to record the names and 
addresses of child sex offenders2. The UK regime was heavily biased against public disclosure of 
information on the Sex Offenders Register, however, in contrast to the transparent arrangements 
adopted by some US states under the 1994 ‘Megan’s Law’ (Brin, 1998, p. 19). Although the 1997 
Act allowed for disclosure in some conditions, the state authorities committed substantial resources 
to preventing leaks and defending a no-disclosure policy. They avoided the use of court imposed 
restrictions on offenders that would reveal identity and fought off pressures for disclosure through 
the courts.3  
 
Even so, the legal requirement that police systematically collect information on ex-offenders 
potentially increased the ‘blamability’ of police, probation and other welfare bureaucracies for inept 
risk-management if released paedophiles reoffended. In consequence, there were at least three 
changes in the institutional management of released offenders. 
 
One strategy was the adoption of more collegial behaviour among the various bureaucracies 
involved in the management of released offenders. This strategy aided the risk management process 
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by increasing information flow between public agencies and, increasingly, ‘trusted’ ‘third sector’ 
voluntary organizations. The adoption of collegial risk-management processes, however, also limited 
the blame-potential for any single agency in the event of a tragedy by distributing responsibility 
amongst all parties. 
 
Linked to the collegial strategy was the adoption of more formal written procedures or 
checklists for risk assessment and management of ex-offenders. The ostensible purpose of such 
protocols was to improve risk decision-making, particularly in allocating scarce resources. But they 
also served the important purpose (as noted by many of our interviewees) of limiting blame by 
forming the basis of a procedural defence for officials if registered offenders committed further 
offences. 
 
A third change, albeit limited, was the classic ‘NIMBY’ response, in the form of a few local 
authorities refusing to provide public housing for ex-offenders in their communities. In other cases, 
some local authorities and housing organizations had to shoulder increased burdens because a bias 
towards conservative risk assessment by local police and probation officials (seeking to protect 
themselves from blame in the event of reoffence) led to a large number of released offenders being 
classed as ‘high risk’. Local authority reluctance to provide public housing for high-profile offenders 
led central government to create secure accommodation for a small number of hard-to-place 
offenders was created in one of the English prisons, but that move itself encountered substantial local 
resistance. 
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(b) Arrangements for Control of Pesticide Residues in Food and Drinking Water 
 
Risks to human health from pesticide residues in food and drinking water have attracted public 
and lobby-group attention since the early days of the environmental movement in the 1960s and have 
been identified as a ‘dread risk’ in the well-known Oregon risk-perception studies (Slovic et al, 1980, 
p. 191). But until the 1980s regulation focused on official approval of pesticides rather than on 
monitoring or controlling residue levels in food and drinking water. In an era of public-enterprise 
drinking water supply there was little or no external regulation other than a statutory duty to supply 
‘wholesome’ water. But this concept was not legally defined and it seems to have been assumed that 
professionalism and public service ethos on the part of water suppliers could be relied upon to ensure 
drinking water was clean and safe (Healey, 1992). Food retailers and suppliers were similarly subject 
to general safety regulations which implied avoidance of excessive pesticide residue levels, but no 
specific limits were laid down in law. 
 
That fairly relaxed approach to regulation of pesticide residue levels changed both for food and 
drinking water in the 1980s, though in different ways. In the case of food, the UK government started 
to introduce statutory maximum residue levels for some pesticides in 1988. ‘Commercial 
confidentiality’ arguments largely prevailed, however, such that food retailers and suppliers were not 
obliged to disclose pesticide residue levels to consumers, and the same went for the local authorities 
responsible for enforcement. At central government level, some ad hoc monitoring of pesticide 
residues was undertaken by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food from 1957, and from 
1988 this monitoring developed into a systematic testing programme with aggregated results 
published annually but sample sources anonymized. 
 
As pressure continued for more openness and transparency, the Pesticides Safety Directorate -the 
UK Government agency responsible for pesticides- responded in two ways. First, it extended 
participation in debate over pesticide regulation by establishing a Pesticides Forum in 1996 which 
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included a broader group of stakeholders such as established and trusted consumer and green groups, 
than the formerly narrow group of insider expert and agribusiness consultees. Second, in 1999 central 
government decided to move away from the previous aggregated and anonymized residue reporting 
to a new ‘name and shame’ approach which identified the retailers and suppliers of food tested 
(MAFF et al, 1999). This apparently radical shift towards greater transparency was limited, however, 
in that annual reporting allowed errant food suppliers to claim that the problems identified had long 
been remedied, with suppliers notified at least eight weeks in advance of publication. It also led, 
perhaps predictably, to greater scrutiny of the adequacy of the government’s sampling and testing 
methodologies by supermarkets, putting more pressure on the transparency of those arrangements. 
 
A more substantial shift towards transparency took place in the case of drinking water, which 
perhaps offers the clearest case of a move from a ‘first-order’ to a ‘second-order’ response in the face 
of demands for more openness. In 1980 levels of pesticide residues in drinking water were limited to 
a ‘surrogate-zero’ level of 0.1ppb by a much-discussed EC Drinking Water Directive (80/778/EEC) 
that epitomized the precautionary doctrine in risk management. The initial response to this Directive 
was far from transparent. At first (according to industry and regulatory officials we interviewed), it 
was simply assumed that the EC’s surrogate-zero threshold was by and large being met, conveniently 
rendering any extensive monitoring effort unnecessary. Research in the early 1980s, however, 
revealed that pesticide levels in drinking water in the UK, and particularly England, exceeded the EC 
limit in many cases. The UK government responded by invoking scientific advice that most of the 
breaches did not represent any health hazard and campaigned (unsuccessfully) on several occasions 
for the replacement of the EC’s blanket precautionary limit by generally higher4 health-based limits 
for individual pesticides. In the meantime UK Ministers formally advised water companies that they 
did not have to observe the precautionary limit as long as health-based limits specified by 
government were met (see Healey and Jones, 1989).  
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Only a few other EU member states undertook any monitoring for pesticide residues in drinking 
water. Member-states response to EU requests for information tended to be one of delay, meaning 
that the European Commission had little information on this subject. Even though monitoring became 
mandatory across the EU after the renegotiation of the Directive in 1998, delay in reporting is likely 
to be a continuing feature of many member state responses. 
 
A major step towards transparency in the UK regime came with the privatization of drinking 
water supply in England and Wales in 1989 (Ward et al, 1995). This privatization conveniently 
removed direct public responsibility for water supply in those parts of the country (specifically 
England) where pesticide contamination of drinking water was a real issue. Part of the privatization 
settlement was an enhanced regulatory regime that embodied freedom of information requirements 
over pesticide residue levels along with mandatory monitoring, such that breaches of the limit were 
openly established. Water companies had to put forward plans to deal with pesticide residues and 
since privatization around £2bn has been spent on compliance, with the costs fully borne by captive 
consumers because the price control regulatory regime for drinking water allowed full cost pass-
through. 
 
(c) Arrangements for Control of Ambient Benzene 
 
Benzene, an air pollutant associated mainly with vehicle exhausts, has been known as a 
genotoxic carcinogen for almost thirty years. But until the 1990s little or no information was 
collected on levels of ambient benzene and there were no legal maximum limits. A similar 
‘unpolitics’ (Crenson, 1971) applied to benzene in other European countries. Indeed, one interviewee 
claimed that ambient benzene only came onto the risk regulation agenda in the late 1980s when a 
petrochemical company objected to proposals to reduce levels of lead in petrol on the grounds that 
benzene emissions would be increased. 
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The long delay in introducing monitoring or targets for benzene began to change in the 1990s. 
Systematic monitoring of urban air quality began to develop in the early 1990s, replacing an earlier 
uneven and ad hoc approach. And, following the line of least resistance, government began 
publishing the results (on CEEFAX and the internet) to avoid the need for bespoke responses to 
green groups and others demanding data under European rules on freedom of access to 
environmental information (SI 1992 No. 3240). Specific targets for benzene, with a long lead-time, 
began to be introduced from the mid-1990s. In 1997 the UK government set an ‘objective’ (whether 
it is a justiciable limit is ambiguous, according to the government’s own lawyers) of not more than 5 
parts per billion as an air quality standard, to take effect only in 2004 (SI 2000 No 928) In a parallel 
process, the EU set a more stringent European objective of just over 1.5 ppb to be achieved by 2010, 
accompanied by mandatory monitoring by member states (see DETR 2000). The delay built into both 
of these targets reflected a calculation that changes in vehicle engine and fuel technology would 
eventually make the targets achievable without excessive pain to bureaucrats or voter-drivers (see 
DETR 1998a, p.7). But even then the long lead-time creates the possibility that targets could be 
altered later if non-achievement seems likely closer to the operative dates. 
 
In setting the benzene ‘objective’ the UK government drew on the recommendations of an 
expert panel (EPAQS/DoE, 1994) that used a new methodology for assessing risk from genotoxic 
carcinogens. The objective provoked pressure for more transparency from the petrochemical 
industry, fearful that its interests might be threatened by the new standards. The department 
responsible (Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions) responded to such criticism in 
a review of advisory processes, concluding that full openness might inhibit candid discussion among 
expert advisors. The proposal was therefore to publish non-verbatim minutes or not attribute remarks 
to named individuals (DETR 1998b, p. 11). 
 
The advent of transparent monitoring and quantified standards for air quality was 
accompanied by at least two notable institutional changes. One was legislation in 1995 (The 
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Environment Act 1995) that laid on local authorities the responsibility for assessing and reviewing 
air quality in their areas in order to meet centrally-imposed standards. This legislation could be 
interpreted as an effort by central government to share or shift blame in the UK context, even though 
the division of responsibilities between central and local government (for instance over trunk roads 
and local roads) create fertile opportunities for mutual blame avoidance.5 A second development was 
that if local authorities failed to achieve the UK targets set to take effect in 2004, the preparation of 
an action plan to reduce benzene levels as part of an Air Quality Management Zone would serve as a 
procedural defence against legal or regulatory sanctions.6
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5. EVALUATING THE INITIAL HYPOTHESES  
 
Table 1 summarizes the institutional responses to openness pressures within each of the three 
‘high-pressure’ RRRs described above, identifying responses that are consistent with the three 
hypotheses set out earlier. It may surprise those who see the first two hypotheses as ‘straw men’ to 
find that both of those hypotheses were consistent with several elements of observed organizational 
behaviour within each of the three high-pressure RRRs. However, neither the null hypothesis (of 
straightforward responses to demands to openness pressures) nor the autopoietic hypothesis (of 
closed discourse communities transforming every external demand into ‘self-reproduction’) can 
account for all the observed responses on its own. There was a substantial amount of organizational 
behaviour that fits institutionalist expectations of distortion or filtration, but there were also 
substantial changes in behaviour or the distribution of power. For instance, water companies and 
regulators had to get used to a transparency regime that would have been unthinkable twenty years 
before and new benzene standards set the stage for an attempt by central government to shift at least 
part of the blame (or glory) over compliance to local authorities. 
.  
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TABLE 1: Institutional Responses to Pressures for Increased Openness Within Three Risk 
Regulation Regimes 
 RRR Domain 
 Arrangements for release 
of paedophiles 
Control of pesticide 
residues 
Control of ambient 
benzene 
 
Degree and Type of 
Pressure for Openness 
Strong public and media 
pressure for public 
disclosure over released 
paedophiles but counter-
pressures on privacy from 
human rights lobbies and 
institutions 
 
General public and media 
concern for more 
information over 
pesticide residues; 
business concern with 
commercial 
confidentiality and 
regulatory requirements 
General public and green 
lobby pressure for more 
information on general air 
pollution, rather than 
benzene in particular; 
strong business pressure 
for transparency over 
standards 
Features of Regulator 
Response 
 
   
Fitting Null Hypothesis Substantial resources 
committed by police to 
collection of information 
on released ex-offenders 
Post 1989 privatized 
water companies now 
generally meet EC limits 
after public disclosure at 
first revealed breaches of 
those limits  
Many local authorities 
adopted a ‘get on with it’ 
approach and central 
government took line of 
least resistance in 
publishing monitoring 
data under EU monitoring 
rules 
 
Fitting Autopoietic 
Hypothesis 
Alteration of procedures 
to keep public disclosure 
to the minimum 
Pre-1989 state-owned 
water suppliers simply 
ignored EC limits (but on 
Ministerial advice) 
Flexible approach to 
national targets and 
objectives– goalposts 
movable in the event of 
non-compliance  
 
Fitting Staged Response 
Hypothesis 
Not much more than 
‘first-order’ responses 
discernible: e.g. more 
resources committed to 
explaining policy of non-
disclosure; alteration of 
procedures to limit 
possibility of blame 
shifting by ‘hang-
together’ approaches; 
extension of checklist 
approach and written 
procedures to provide 
procedural defence 
against blame; NIMBY 
approach of refusal to 
house by a few local 
authorities  
 
Not much more than 
‘first-order’ responses 
discernible in food (with 
reorientation of regulators 
to ‘control of control’ but 
limited and delayed 
disclosure policy over 
non-compliance). 
 
Apparently clearer case 
of progression to 
‘second-order’ in 
drinking water, with 
eventual move to 
‘transparent compliance’ 
approach after earlier 
delay and regulatory 
collusion over evasion.  
Not much more than 
‘first-order’ responses 
discernible, with 
developing ‘inertia 
compliance’ approach of 
delaying onset of targets 
until long-term 
technological changes 
can be expected to deliver 
compliance without ‘hard 
choices’, linked with 
reorientation of formal 
responsibility to make 
culpability ambiguous in 
the event of non-
compliance. 
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By a process of elimination we might conclude that observed organizational behaviour in 
these three cases fits the ‘staged response’ hypothesis more closely than the other two. It will be 
recalled from Figure 1 that Laughlin and his colleagues divided ‘first-order’ institutional responses to 
environmental disturbance into ‘rebuttal’ and ‘reorientation’ strategies. Both strategies were readily 
observable in the three high-pressure RRRs. ‘Problem denial’ and resistance to demands for 
transparent operation occurred in some form in all of them, often (but not always) at an early stage of 
policy development – such as the defensive information-sharing approach developed in the 
paedophiles regime. ‘Reorientation’ also figured prominently in institutional behaviour, notably in 
the redistribution of responsibilities with the aim of reducing blame or liability or the introduction of 
additional complexity into organizational structures. An example was central government’s 
designation of local authorities as responsible for local air quality with the advent of standards and 
monitoring, creating a structure in which blame for failure to meet targets is ambiguous. 
 
But little evidence could be found of a clear progression from a ‘first-order’ of unchanged 
institutional values to a ‘second-order’ when those values had changed. Drinking water seemed to be 
the only fairly clear-cut case of such a progression, since it moved from an initial pattern of see-no-
evil denial and regulatory collusion over evasion in the public-enterprise era to a substantially 
transparent regime after privatization. Across much of what was observed in institutional responses, 
it seems hard to argue that there was a clear shift between what Laughlin and similar analysts see as 
‘first-order’ institutional responses to disturbances to ‘second-order’ responses at a later stage. 
 
Indeed, the organizational value that seems most consistent with the pattern of responses 
described in the last section is that of limiting blame and liability. But blame-and-liability limiting 
considerations had different implications for organizations dependent on their institutional position. 
In the high-pressure regimes, public sector regulators adopted reorientation or rebuttal strategies 
where new standards threatened to increase their exposure to blame or make their jobs more stressful, 
as in the case of paedophiles. But those public regulators took up different stances where openness 
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could not be expected to have such consequences (as in the case of ambient benzene, where the long 
delay over implementation against a changing pattern of vehicle and fuel technology meant standards 
would be likely to be reached by a process of ‘inertia compliance’). 
 
Similar variation applied to private-sector organizations where they formed part of the 
regulatory regimes, notably as intermediaries applying ‘enforced self-regulation’ (Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992), as in the cases of pesticide residues in food and water. Where such organizations 
were in competitive markets, as in the case of food and agribusiness companies, blame-and-liability 
limitation led them to press for greater transparency over regulatory standard-setting, but to oppose it 
over enforcement on grounds of ‘commercial confidentiality’. However, private sector organizations 
in monopoly positions with pass-through price control regimes, as in the case of the privatized water 
utilities, had much less reason to adopt such a position. If blame-and-liability limitation was a key 
consideration in organizational responses to demands for greater openness, it played out differently 
according to institutional position and type, and it could play out differently at regime and 
organizational level.  
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6. MODIFYING THE INITIAL HYPOTHESES 
 
A hypothesis that would fit best with these, admittedly limited, observations seems to be a 
mixture of the second and third hypotheses, i.e. a weak form of autopoiesis and a staged-response 
approach dominated by ‘first-order’ responses at an organizational level. A modified hypothesis of 
that type, compatible with the behaviour observed, would have the following seven components. 
 
(a) The response of individual regulator organizations to demands for increased openness in RRRs is 
heavily conditioned by the expected implications for blame and liability, but those implications are 
not the same for all organizations. 
 
(b) Where a shift to increased openness and transparency has major expected implications for blame 
and liability, organizations facing demands for greater openness will tend to engage in ‘blame 
prevention reengineering’ (BPR),7 seeking to transfer or dissipate the increased blame or liability that 
increased transparency or new information requirements might bring.  
 
(c) The repertoire of ‘blame prevention reengineering’ responses at organizational level can be 
broadly characterized in Laughlin’s terms as variants of ‘rebuttal’ and ‘reorientation’ behaviour, but 
comprised at least six different specific responses, as shown in Table 2. Apart from simple rebuttal 
and reorientation in the ordinary-language sense of these terms, the four other observed responses 
were as follows:  
 
Delay in responding to demands for greater openness was a feature of observed organizational 
behaviour in all the high-pressure regimes. Delay is a common bureaucratic response to freedom of 
information regimes (see, for example, Roberts’ (1998, pp. 3-6) analysis of responses to Canadian 
FOI legislation). The clearest example from the three regimes was the delay by EU member states (in 
some cases by up to several years) in supplying information to the European Commission on 
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pesticide residue levels in drinking water in the mid-1990s. Variants on the ‘delay’ theme also 
included ‘planned obsolescence’ in reporting violations of standards (pesticide residues in food) and 
delaying the onset of targets when monitoring information becomes available (ambient benzene). 
And finally, in the paedophiles regime, the police only disclosed the identity of known offenders to 
the public as a last resort if nothing else could ensure public safety. 
 
‘Pre-buttal’ was also an observed BPR response by organizations facing demands for increased 
openness – attempts by organizations to respond to anticipated criticisms or demands for information 
before they materialize. At one level this response involves an increase in organizational 
sophistication or capacity to cope with a ‘goldfish-bowl’ existence (more flak-catchers and 
environmental scanners to get the organization’s retaliation in first, which was a notable feature of 
police responses to the 1997 Sex Offenders Act). The key feature of prebuttal is the manufacture of 
excuses or alibis in advance, such that attempts to blame an organization in the light of increased 
transparency will fail to hit their target. 
 
‘Protocolization’ or formalization of organizational operations, was a third observed BPR response, 
and indeed such behaviour is a standard bureaucratic approach to minimizing blame and liability 
problems (see Lawton and Parker, 1998). Following transparent rules potentially provides ‘due 
diligence’ defences when an organization’s risk management comes to be questioned and produces a 
verifiable 'audit trail' for regulators (see Power, 1997). As the account of the three RRRs in section 4 
indicated, protocolization in some form appeared in all cases and particularly in the paedophile 
regime, where it was central to the defensive blame prevention reengineering strategy of the public 
organizations concerned. 
 
Service abandonment – the abandonment of some types of service altogether – was observable as a 
drastic BPR response to openness pressures in some cases. Such a response is more commonly 
observable among regulatees (particularly small or marginal operators faced with increasing 
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regulatory burdens) than among regulators or public authorities. But it can occur in the latter case, for 
instance when public authorities stop issuing advice or information for fear of blame, legal liability 
or other adverse reactions. In the three high-pressure regimes, the clearest case of service 
abandonment was observed in the paedophiles regime. That was the refusal by some local authorities 
to resettle paedophile ex-offenders classed as ‘high risk’ by the joint deliberation process described 
above. That service-abandonment response partly created the need for a national back-stop facility as 
described earlier. 
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TABLE 2: Six Varieties of Institutional Response 
RRR Domain  
 
Institutional Response 
Management of 
Paedophile Release 
Pesticide Residues in 
Food & Drinking Water 
Ambient Benzene 
 
Delay 
 
Public disclosure of 
information about 
paedophiles only as final 
resort 
 
Heavy emphasis in 
drinking water – e.g. delay 
by some EU member 
states in reporting levels 
of pesticide residues in 
drinking water, and built-
in delay in ‘naming and 
shaming’ policy over food 
 
Heavy emphasis – 20-year 
delay in developing 
monitoring after discovery 
of benzene as a genotoxic 
pollutant; delay in EU 
member states’ response 
to Commission demands 
for information; delay of 
onset of targets until 
technological change 
makes them likely to be 
achievable without pain 
 
Simple Rebuttal Rejection and legal 
contestation of demands 
for greater public 
disclosure 
Original denial of 
compliance problem over 
drinking water, followed 
by assertion that no health 
hazard involved in breach 
of EC precautionary 
limits; use of commercial 
confidentiality to limit 
public disclosure over 
food 
 
 
Organizational 
Reorientation 
Pooling information to 
share blame for 
management of risks of 
registered paedophiles 
Privatization of water in 
England and Wales 
creating greater ambiguity 
over blame in failure to 
meet standards 
Assignment of 
management 
responsibilities to local 
authorities, creating a 
structure of studied 
ambiguity through 
organizational 
complexification over 
blame for non-
achievement of targets 
 
Service Abandonment Some local authorities 
refusing to house 
registered paedophiles 
 
  
Protocolization Checklist approach as a 
procedural defence against 
blame 
‘Due diligence’ checklist 
defence developed in food 
after 1990 Food Safety 
Act, and in water 
‘Management plan’ as 
potential defence against 
blame by local authorities 
not in compliance with 
targets 
 
Prebuttal Increasing effort of 
agencies to explain 
management of offenders 
in the community to local 
residents without 
disclosing specific 
information 
‘Control of control’ 
approach in food to limit 
regulator exposure to 
blame 
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(d) The six types of blame prevention reengineering responses discussed above and summarized in 
Table 2 will not necessarily succeed in deflecting blame in practice, and need not necessarily follow 
any fixed or uniform sequence. While simple rebuttal can often be expected to come at an early stage 
in the sequence of responses, these cases suggest that rebuttal may precede, follow or accompany a 
delay response, and rebuttal’s ‘cousin’ pre-buttal may come later in the sequence of responses. 
Service abandonment, protocolization and reorganization of organizational boundaries, procedures or 
responsibilities likewise need not take place in any particular order. 
 
(e) Many of the six organizational BPR responses observed here are hard to categorize according to 
the distinction between first- and second-order responses discussed earlier. Many if not all of them 
could be responses of both types. For example, ‘prebuttal’ might be a sophisticated first-order 
response, representing a high point of anticipation and manipulative capacity. But it could also be a 
second-order response by an organization that has so thoroughly absorbed openness values that its 
public information-base constitutes a way of nipping in the bud demands for more transparency. 
Protocolization also seems ambiguous in terms of any distinction between first-order and second-
order responses, since it could either be a symptom of an organization that has adopted new values or 
simply function as an official shield against prying outsiders, offering a procedural defence that 
established routines have been followed. Service abandonment too might be an extreme form of first-
order response – perhaps the only way to keep underlying values unchanged - or it could be the 
ultimate expression of change in values. 
 
(f) This account of organizational responses to pressures for increased openness in RRRs, 
represented in Figure 2, is a mixture of weak autopoiesis and a less linear form of our initial third 
(staged-response) hypothesis. It looks less like an evolutionary ladder or stairway than a ‘Catherine 
Wheel’ (a type of rotating firework). It conceives of a ‘problem space’ (constituted by demands for 
increased openness and accountability over risk management) to which organizations within a regime 
can respond in any of the ways discussed above. If those responses relieve the ‘openness pressure’, 
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the system moves out of the ‘problem space’. But if the response fails to relieve the pressure, the 
system returns to the ‘problem space’ for another iteration. There is no automatic sequence of 
response and no necessary ‘ladder’ process. And apart from simple rebuttal (but not ‘prebuttal’) each 
of the organizational responses depicted on Figure 2 could be linked with both value change and 
value stasis. 
 
(g) Outcomes for openness at regime level will depend on the combination of individual 
organizational responses, and on the distribution of power among the various organizations in the 
regime. Even if some organizations within a RRR adopt a ‘null hypothesis’ response to pressures for 
greater openness, the regime as a whole will not necessarily exhibit greater openness if other 
organizations adopt autopoietic or ‘first-order’ responses. 
FIGURE 2. A ‘Catherine Wheel’ Approach to Institutional Blame Prevention Re-Engineering 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
 The analysis here is based on a limited number of cases, so conclusions are tentative and the 
repertoire of observed responses by organizations to pressures for increased openness is not likely to 
be exhaustive. For instance, the response of data falsification which has been observed in other risk 
and safety regimes (for example in nuclear safety and chemical safety [see The Independent, 14.9.99; 
Millstone, 1986, p. 99]) was not observed in the three high-pressure regimes examined here, though 
it is included among the repertoire of possible responses in Figure 2. Detailed investigation of more 
cases and further differentiation of types of pressures for increased openness (distinguishing, for 
instance, different sources and patterns of incidence over time) is needed for systematic identification 
of what types of pressures for openness produce what types of BPR responses in what types of 
organization. 
 
Nevertheless, three fairly clear conclusions can be drawn from this study. First, not all 
domains of risk regulation are exposed equally – or at all – to long-term pressures for greater 
transparency and openness. Only half of the cases considered here fell into that category. Second, 
observation of institutional responses in three RRRs exposed to openness pressures suggests 
institutional filtering or distortion processes can readily be detected. The null hypothesis was 
compatible with only a minority of observations, and hence it seems dangerous to base design of 
regulatory arrangements on some version of the null hypothesis. Such an assumption may lead to 
unanticipated ‘toothpaste tube’ outcomes (in the language of Baldwin and Hawkins (1984, p. 582)) in 
which a squeeze at one point in a regime is accompanied by a bulge at another and the net change is 
problematic. Something closer to an institutional-design equivalent of the well-known precautionary 
principle would seem a more robust basis for policy.  
 
Third, much of what was observed in the three high-pressure RRRs is compatible with a 
model of dynamic interaction between organizations and their environment in which inertia is the 
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default response and BPR considerations heavily influence a varied repertoire of further responses. 
The ‘Catherine wheel’ schema portrayed by Figure 2 summarizes such a model. The implication is 
that society-wide generalizations about risk regulation based on aggregated conceptions of ‘risk 
society’ (Beck, 1992) will have little power to predict or explain the variety (both static and 
dynamic) of risk regulation regimes. A less aggregated level of analysis, and more attention to 
institutional filtering, is needed for that purpose. 
 
Three other more tentative and closely related conclusions can also be drawn from this study. 
One is that what happens over transparency and openness at the regime level of risk regulation can be 
different from what happens at the level of individual organizations. For example, in some risk 
domains numerous organizations may move to higher levels of openness, but the regime as a whole 
remains limitedly open, because a key group of players whose information is needed to complete the 
loop in some way, stay at the level of first-order responses. Something approximating to that pattern 
was exhibited in the pesticide residues in food regime (where enforced self-regulation by food 
retailers remained largely within the realms of commercial confidentiality). A regime can involve 
commercial confidentiality as the main bulwark against disclosure even if public institutions become 
procedurally more open. Alternatively, even if the various regulator organizations within an RRR 
respond to pressures for openness by increased organizational complexification (as in sub-
contracting or decoupling of RRRs), the upshot may be a regime that is even harder for ordinary 
consumers, workers or citizens to understand, hence substantively more opaque even if each 
component organization is procedurally more open. 
 
Equally, in some domains all that is needed for the regime as a whole to move to greater 
transparency and openness is for one powerful organizational player to change its position. As we 
saw, in the case of pesticide residues in water, the UK central government’s move to privatize 
drinking water supply in England and Wales meant that it no longer had an interest in opacity over 
pesticide levels, and the result was a regime that was substantially open. To understand regulatory 
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dynamics over openness, a distinction between regime and individual organizational responses and 
outcomes is crucial.  
 
A further conclusion is that strategies intended to avoid blame will not necessary achieve that 
effect in practice (which is why Figure 2 incorporates iterative search) and may still produce effects 
incorporating some of the policy consequences conventionally associated with increased openness, as 
noted at the outset. For example, even if the police response to statutory requirements for registration 
of paedophile ex-offenders is interpreted as dominated by BPR considerations of locking in all the 
other public-sector players into collective deliberation, the effect of that strategy was nevertheless to 
enhance intelligence and shared information across the regime. Similarly, even if blame-shifting was 
a key factor in UK central government response assigning responsibility to local authorities for 
ambient benzene in the face of openness pressures, those authorities nevertheless had to compile 
explicit and locally-oriented responses against a background of published benzene monitoring data. 
While BPR-dominated responses to pressures for increased openness may in some conditions detract 
from policy effectiveness through the side-effects they produce (for instance in service abandonment 
or goal displacement through protocolization, one of the classic sources of bureaucratic dysfunction 
identified by Merton (1960)), they can also in some conditions contribute to greater policy capacity 
and intelligence. 
 
Finally, this analysis shows regulatory regimes and organizations can respond to openness 
pressures from different starting-points and in different ways. Not all of the responses included in the 
Catherine-wheel model in Figure 2 are necessarily available to all organizations in a regime. And if 
responses and starting-points are diverse, so are the policy consequences of shifts in openness and 
transparency. For example, in the paedophile regime, change began from a low level of transparency 
and took the form of increased internal openness among the professional-bureaucratic players in the 
field rather than disclosure to the public at large. Given the risk/risk tradeoffs involved in increased 
openness to the public at large in that domain, it is far from indisputable that full public disclosure 
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would lead to an increase in overall policy effectiveness in limiting risk. The same does not apply to 
risk domains like pesticide residues and ambient benzene. 
 
The purpose of this paper is primarily descriptive and comparative. The study it describes 
sought to observe and analyze institutional responses to pressures for increased openness in RRRs, 
not to follow the many authors who have discussed the inherent desirability or otherwise of 
increasing openness in risk management (e.g. Shrader-Frechette, 1991) or the much-discussed policy 
dilemmas associated with such openness.8 Nevertheless, descriptive and analytic work of this kind 
has implications for normative questions of policy and institutional design. 
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Appendix 1: Changes in Openness and Six UK RRRs  
(A) Three Cases With Little General Increase In Pressures For Openness Over 20 Years 
 
 Enduring Features 
 
 
 
Domain 
Information Rules 
(a) Reporting/ collecting obligations 
(b) Publication/ disclosure obligations 
Participation and Scrutiny Rules 
(a) Consultation obligations 
(b) Formal Public Accountability 
Rules 
De Facto 
Accountability to 
Public Scrutiny 
Overall Openness 
 
Radon in 
homes 
 
(a) No obligation on property owners to 
undertake tests; no obligation on 
government to assess radon levels (apart 
from a 1990 EC recommendation that 
member states assess radon levels); UK 
government by convention has 
conducted a UK-wide survey of radon 
levels by area 
 
(b) Caveat emptor rule on disclosure for 
property vendors: Government by 
convention publishes radon levels by 
area but not house by house 
 
 
(a) Consultation by convention 
only with international policy 
community of radon experts and 
UK radiation professionals 
 
(b) Limited formal 
accountability rules with 
responsibility located in an 
expert UK-wide quango 
relatively detached from 
government departments 
  
 
Low – kept 
within 
professional 
sphere 
 
LOW 
 
Low salience and 
‘expertized’ but 
with official risk 
data base providing 
general 
information 
Dangerous  
Dogs 
(a) No general obligation to register 
dogs (except for 4 types specified in 
1991and in N. Ireland); no obligation on 
public reporting of dog attacks and or for 
state authorities to collect or collate dog 
accident statistics (except N. Ireland) 
 
(b) No obligation for dogs to carry ID 
(by chips/collar tags etc) except for 4 
types specified under 1991 Act and no 
obligation to publish or disclose any risk 
information 
 
(a) Ministers obliged to consult 
domestic dog experts but little 
international consultation 
 
(b) Parliamentary 
scrutiny/questions to Ministers; 
other formal accountability 
through local councillors and 
police 
 
Variable media 
and political 
engagement 
depending on 
public salience of 
issue 
MEDIUM 
 
Occasional high 
salience but no 
official risk 
database 
Road 
Accident 
Risks 
(a) Statutory obligation to report vehicle 
accidents and since 1974 for local 
authorities to assess and reduce road 
risks. Vehicle manufacturers obliged to 
conduct safety tests, and by convention a 
new EU assessments of safety 
performance of cars 
 
(b) By convention national government 
publishes aggregated road accident data 
and values of benefits of prevention of 
road accidents for use in CBA and 
appraisal of safety projects, and local 
road accident statistics are disclosed by 
discretion. Commercial confidentiality 
over vehicle safety test data but by 
convention EU publishes results of car 
safety performance programme 
 
(a) Local authorities  obliged to 
consult local residents for traffic 
management schemes requiring 
Road Traffic Orders. Safety 
standard setting for vehicles 
expertized. 
 
 
(b) Mainly through local 
councillors for local road safety 
engineering but limited by 
professionalized and 
‘protocolized’ nature of road 
traffic engineering 
 
 
Medium mainly 
localized, 
occasionally 
higher in 
response to ‘big 
news tragedies’. 
 
 
MEDIUM TO 
HIGH 
 
Mainly localized 
salience and 
largely 
‘expertized’ but 
with official risk 
data base providing 
general 
information, and 
slowly increasing 
information on car 
safety performance 
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Appendix 1 (Cont.): (B) Three Cases Subject To Increasing Pressures For Openness Over 20 Years 
 
 Status Quo Features  Post Status Quo Features 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Domain 
Information 
Rules 
(a) Reporting/ 
collecting 
obligations 
(b) Publication / 
disclosure 
obligations 
Participation and 
Scrutiny Rules 
(a) Consultation 
obligations 
(b) Formal Public 
Accountability 
Rules 
De Facto 
Accountability 
to Public 
Scrutiny 
Overall 
Openness
 Information 
Rules 
(a) Reporting/ 
collecting 
obligations 
(b) Publication / 
disclosure 
obligations 
Participation and 
Scrutiny Rules 
(a) Consultation 
obligations 
(b) Formal 
Public 
Accountability 
Rules 
De Facto 
Accountability 
to Public 
Scrutiny 
Overall 
Openness 
 
Ambient 
Benzene 
 
(a) No legal 
obligation to 
collect 
information on 
ambient benzene 
until 1997 
 
(b) No legal 
obligation to 
disclose 
 
(a) By convention 
consultation 
restricted to 
professionals 
 
 
 
(b) No defined 
regulator 
responsibility 
apart from 
general 
Ministerial 
responsibility 
 
Minimal until 
1990s 
 
LOW 
  
(a) Statutory 
obligations on 
local authorities  
and other bodies 
to assess and 
manage ambient 
air quality. 
 
 
 
 
(b) Statutory 
disclosure of 
ambient benzene 
levels under EU 
Freedom of 
Information rules 
and public 
dissemination 
 
 
(a) Ministers 
obliged to 
consult widely 
on ambient air 
quality policy. 
EU consultation 
with business 
and public 
interest groups 
by convention 
 
(b) Overlapping 
local authority, 
quango and 
central 
government 
responsibility 
 
 
Medium – low 
specifically for 
benzene but 
relatively high 
media and 
political 
engagement on 
general air 
pollution 
 
MEDIUM 
TO HIGH  
 
Move to 
more 
transparent 
standards 
and 
information 
on ambient 
air quality 
from a low 
base 
Paedo-
philes 
(a) No general 
duty on 
government to 
collect 
information on 
offenders and no 
general duty on 
offenders to 
report 
 
(b) No duty or 
convention to 
disclose  
(a) No obligation 
to consult and 
little/no 
consultation by 
convention 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Orthodox 
ministerial and 
police 
accountability 
 
Low – kept 
within 
professional 
sphere 
LOW  (a) Police duty to 
keep record of 
released 
offenders and 
offenders duty to 
report 
 
 
 
 
(b) No change on 
publication / 
disclosure 
obligations 
 
(a) Consultation 
and exchange of 
information 
across public 
agencies by 
convention 
including other 
organizations by 
discretion 
 
(b) No change on 
formal public 
accountability 
rules 
 
Low – kept 
within 
professional 
sphere 
LOW  
 
Creation of 
official 
database 
and consul-
tation 
across 
govern-
ment but 
limited or 
no general 
disclosure  
Pesticide 
Residues 
(a) General duty 
on food and 
drinking water 
suppliers to test 
for fitness for 
human 
consumption 
 
(b) No duty or 
convention to 
disclose 
information until 
late 1980s for 
both water and 
food suppliers 
(a) No general 
consultation 
outside 
professional 
community 
 
 
 
(b) Mix of local 
authorities and 
central 
government for 
food; minimal for 
water providers 
Low – kept 
within 
professional 
sphere 
LOW  (a) Obligation on 
food and 
drinking water 
suppliers to test 
for pesticide 
residues 
 
 
(b) Water 
regulators 
obliged to 
publish residue 
data. Food 
regulators 
introducing 
‘name and 
shame’ policy by 
convention  
 
(a) More general 
consultation by 
convention 
beyond a narrow 
professional 
group (except for 
approvals) 
 
(b) No change 
for food on 
formal public 
accountability 
rules; specific 
regulators for 
water since 1988 
Medium – 
increasing 
media and 
political 
engagement  
MEDIUM 
 
Starting 
from low 
base, more 
trans-
parency on 
water and 
to a lesser 
extent on 
food 
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NOTES 
 
1 This paper draws on a research project financed by ESRC (grant no.  L211252043), and we thank ESRC and the LSE 
for financial support. The project compared risk regulation regimes in a total of nine different policy domains, based on 
documentary analysis, media analysis and over 300 interviews with regulatory players. 
2 As well as some other types of sex offenders. 
3 In a 1997 test case, a court upheld the status quo, holding that disclosure should be only on a need-to-know basis, not a 
matter of general entitlement (R v. Chief Constable for the North Wales Police Area Authority et al, 10 July 1997). 
4 A few pesticides present risks to health at residue levels below 0.1ppb.  
5 In an EU context central rather than local government would be answerable to the European Court of Justice over 
failure to meet standards. 
6 By contrast the EU regime required member states were obliged to meet specified targets by 2010, but the even longer 
implementation lead-time creates scope for member states to apply for derogations from the Air Quality Directive 
(96/62/EC) and its associated Directives before the target takes effect. 
7 BPR in the language of management science conventionally denotes 'business process re-engineering'. But BPR as 
blame prevention engineering seems equally important in organizational behaviour. 
8 Such dilemmas include the danger of increasing public risks through exploitation of information by criminals or 
terrorists (Sieber, 1981), through panic responses to official information (Partridge, 1988, pp. 330-43) and through 
complacency or placation, with reduction in care and alertness. 
